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Abstract: Developing countries are characterized by political settlements where formal 
rules are generally weakly enforced and widely violated. Conventional anti-corruption 
strategies that focus on improving the general enforcement of a rule of law and raising 
the costs of corruption facing individual public officials have typically delivered poor 
results in these contexts. Our alternative approach is to identify anti-corruption 
strategies that have a high impact and that are feasible to implement in these contexts.  
 
Our alternative approach identifies anti-corruption strategies from the bottom up. This 
involves identifying the characteristics of the corruption constraining particular 
development outcomes. By drawing on theories of rents and rent seeking, and theories 
of political settlements, we can assess the developmental impact of particular anti-
corruption strategies and the feasibility of implementing these strategies.  
 
We argue that feasible anti-corruption in these contexts cannot be solely based on 
conventional anti-corruption strategies. In societies that have widespread rule 
violations, high-impact anti-corruption is only likely to be feasible if the overall strategy 
succeeds in aligning the interests and capabilities of powerful organizations at the 
sectoral level to support the enforcement of particular sets of rules. We examine four 
related strategies for changing these incentives and capabilities of critical stakeholders 
at the local or sectoral level and we argue that this can provide a framework for 
organizing research on the impact and feasibility of anti-corruption activities in 
different priority areas in particular countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is closely related to the weak enforcement of a rule of law. Corruption 
involves different types of rule-violations by bureaucrats, politicians and businesses 
where power is misused for private benefit. Not surprisingly, corruption is also strongly 
correlated with the weak enforcement of formal institutions in general, including 
property rights and the formal rules of politics. All of these in turn also appear to be 
strongly correlated with the level of development of the country’s productive structure. 
Countries that have high levels of corruption are likely to have weak property rights, a 
weak rule of law, high levels of corruption, informal political rents, and low levels of 
productive capabilities (even if they sometimes have high per capita incomes as a result 
of natural resources). These correlations raise important questions and challenges for 
policy.  
 
Causality clearly runs in both directions. Low levels of development make it difficult 
to fight corruption and enforce formal rules, for instance because resources and 
incentives for enforcement are limited. At the same time, high levels of corruption can 
work in the opposite direction: slowing down development by reducing and distorting 
productive investments, thereby making it difficult to achieve the high levels of 
development that would make overall reductions of corruption possible. This means 
there has to be some forms of effective anti-corruption even at lower levels of 
development. However, the effects of weak productive capabilities on constraining 
enforcement capabilities in traditional anti-corruption strategies have often been 
seriously underestimated. Designing effective policies therefore requires a strategic 
rethinking of anti-corruption strategies.  
 
In our argument, two systemic problems linked to the nature of political settlements in 
developing and emerging countries make it difficult to implement the usual top-down 
anti-corruption strategies where improvements in enforcement capabilities, stricter 
punishments, and changes in incentives and costs of corruption are attempted across 
the board (Khan 1995, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2010, 2012).  
 
First, formal rules and across-the-board anti-corruption strategies are only likely to be 
effectively enforced when their enforcement is aligned with the interests of powerful 
organizations in the country. When is this likely? Countries become more advanced as 
they acquire a more diverse set of productive organizations in different sectors and 
activities. As these organizations become more productive, they also become more 
powerful. They pay more taxes, fund political parties, employ more people and 
therefore begin to have a greater say in what politicians and bureaucrats do. The 
growing complexity of the economy also means that more and more of these 
organizations begin to have an interest in the enforcement of the formal rules required 
to conduct complex businesses and transactions. More economically developed 
societies therefore have a greater number and diversity of organizations that both have 
the incentive to want rule enforcement in general and have the power to do something 
about it. In contrast, the organizations that are powerful in less developed societies are 
fewer in number, and more importantly, less dependent on competitiveness and market 
transactions for their revenues. They can feasibly interact with each other in informal 
ways and generate rents through political connections. If the most powerful 
3 
 
organizations in a country do not want the enforcement of formal rules, it is unlikely 
that a rule of law will emerge simply through enforcement efforts from above. 
 
Secondly, as countries become more productive and diversified, political parties can 
raise enough revenues through formal taxation and legal political contributions to 
maintain their organizations and political constituencies. Parties in advanced countries 
have to raise revenues from a great diversity of business interests and sectors and this 
sets a limit to special privileges that can be granted. These characteristics ensure that 
political parties have both the ability to be rule-following (because taxes and legal 
resources are substantial) and face the compulsion to follow rules (because rule-
violating parties can lose significant sources of funding) and this makes them rule-
following in their own interest. It is not just the quantum of revenue but also the 
diversity of sources that is important. When many sectors and firms are powerful, 
special privileges for a few will be effectively opposed by many others. This is why if 
a developing country has lot of tax revenue from one or two sources it does not 
necessarily become rule-following. More typically, in poorer countries, political parties 
can only raise significant revenues in informal and rule-violating ways, and when in 
power, the most feasible way of rewarding their supporters is to allow them to violate 
more rules. In these contexts, it is difficult for political leaders to exercise ‘political 
will’ to enforce rules when their tenure depends on doing otherwise.  
 
Without broad support for generalized rule-following behaviour in a society, either 
from powerful economic or political organizations, anti-corruption strategies that 
assume that it is possible to enforce generalized rules are likely to be poorly 
implemented in practice. A feasible anti-corruption strategy in such contexts should 
instead be to sequentially attack specific instances of corruption where the anti-
corruption strategy is both feasible and has a high impact on development. To be 
feasible, there has to be some combination of feasible policy change, institutional 
adjustment or the mobilization of existing organizations or the creation new ones, which 
together create sufficient support for the enforcement of particular anti-corruption 
strategies.  When these bottom-up anti-corruption strategies target important areas of 
development, they can enable more productive investments and activities, better 
developmental outcomes and more inclusive growth, and eventually help to create a 
broader-based productive economy with more power centres with a growing interest in 
the enforcement of generalized formal rules. This in turn will make possible 
successively more ambitious anti-corruption strategies, ultimately making strategies for 
improving generalized rule-enforcement through the enforcement of a rule of law or 
society-level transparency and accountability more likely to work.  
 
The immediate anti-corruption priorities will depend on the sectors and processes that 
are most important for sustaining inclusive growth in particular countries. Identifying 
high-impact anti-corruption activities is very important if the effort invested in anti-
corruption is to be justified. A common error here is to equate the impact of corruption 
with the magnitude of bribes. An activity with relatively small bribes can have a high 
development impact, for instance if relatively small bribes prevent the enforcement of 
regulations on food adulteration and result in deaths and illnesses or lower the quality 
of health and education services. In contrast, activities with significant bribes may 
sometimes have a lower impact. For instance, some profit-sharing transfers from 
businesses to politicians may have a lower negative impact on development if the 
productivity of investments is not too adversely affected. A high-impact anti-corruption 
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approach therefore has to identify anti-corruption priorities on the basis of a transparent 
assessment of impact, and from these, target the ones where anti-corruption is most 
feasible. The priority areas can differ across countries depending on the structures of 
their economies and the drivers of growth in these contexts. Anti-corruption policy has 
to identify how corruption may be blocking sustainable development and assess the 
feasibility of strategies to address these constraints given the configuration of interests 
affected by potential anti-corruption strategies.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the limitations of 
existing approaches to anti-corruption, section 3 outlines our alternative approach for 
identifying feasible and high-impact anti-corruption strategies. Section 4 summarizes 
four clusters of feasible and high-impact anti-corruption strategies identified on the 
basis of our previous work and finally, section 5 summarizes the research agenda that 
emerges for developing theory and evidence in a number of anti-corruption evidence 
(ACE) clusters in our ACE research programme.  
 
2. Limitations of conventional anti-corruption approaches  
Conventional anti-corruption strategies have attempted to attack corruption by 
improving rule-following behaviour across the board, and in particular, rule-following 
behaviour by public officials. The first strategy that has informed conventional anti-
corruption approaches has been to strengthen the general enforcement of a rule of law 
and the enforcement of property rights. This strategy has been supported by evidence 
that appeared to show correlations between institutional characteristics of societies like 
the degree to which the rule of law is enforced and their levels of corruption (Ades and 
Di Tella 1996; Rauch and Evans 2000; Treisman 2000; World Bank 2000; Lambsdorff 
2005). A second strategy that has also informed conventional approaches has been 
driven by microeconomic principal-agent models that argued that asymmetric 
information may allow public officials to subvert the public purpose by engaging in 
corruption in their own self-interest. The policy response that follows from this 
perspective is to attempt to change the behaviour of bureaucrats with changes in 
incentives like better pay structures, better monitoring and stricter punishments (Rose-
Ackerman 1978; Klitgaard 1988; Andvig and Moene 1990; Huther and Shah 2000; 
Spector 2005).  
 
 
 Figure 1 Conventional Anti-Corruption Approaches 
 
The most common conventional approaches to anti-corruption are therefore based on a 
combination of strategies to improve the enforcement of formal rules across the board, 
together with policies that seek to change the cost-benefit calculations of individual 
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public officials, as summarized in Figure 1. However, neither approach has delivered 
satisfactory results because they did not recognize that anti-corruption strategies in 
developing countries have to be designed to be effective in contexts where generalized 
rule-following cannot be achieved for structural reasons of the type discussed earlier. 
If reforms cannot immediately change the characteristics of societies so that they 
become generally rule-following, then anti-corruption strategies that assume that this 
can be done are likely to fail. Moreover, strategies that seek to change the behaviour of 
individual bureaucrats are also likely to fail if they ignore the fact that these public 
officials are operating in networks and social contexts where rule-following behaviour 
is widely flouted. Indeed individual bureaucrats or politicians who insist on following 
rules are likely to be removed or ostracized by their peers and superiors.  
 
The characteristics of political settlements in developing countries that prevent 
generalized rule-following behaviour may still be contested by some (for instance 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) but the limitations of standard anti-corruption strategies 
are now widely recognized and the underlying reasons are entirely consistent with our 
analysis of political settlements. For instance, a DFID review of anti-corruption 
strategies shows that most anti-corruption strategies failed because they ignored 
critically important policy interdependencies. These interdependencies include those 
between individual calculations by public officials at the micro-level and political, 
social and cultural structures at the macro-level and interdependencies between 
different policies that were targeted by anti-corruption strategies and many other 
policies and institutions that could not be targeted but which nevertheless collectively 
resulted in the persistence of corruption (DFID 2015). This is a recognition that in a 
society where there is a general absence of rule-following behaviour, focusing on the 
enforcement of generalized rules, or attempting to change the behaviour of individuals 
with targeted incentives is very likely to fail.  
 
A related aspect of the problem with conventional anti-corruption strategies is that they 
do not distinguish between policy variables, which are variables that decision-makers 
can change (including some institutions and organisations), and the institutional, 
organisational and political characteristics of countries that are outcomes of gradual 
evolutionary changes that lead to important structural transformations over time. The 
latter cannot be immediately changed by policy. The quality of the ‘rule of law’ in a 
country, or the ‘independence of its judiciary’ are examples of institutional 
characteristics that are outcomes of complex processes that involve many 
interdependent institutions and organizations, and are not immediate policy variables. 
A policy-maker cannot ‘decide’ to improve the rule of law in a society where 
enforcement is weak. Evidence collected on the basis of flawed analytical models can 
show correlations between corruption and a series of other ‘variables’, but if these are 
not policy variables, this evidence is not very useful in telling policy-makers what they 
can do.  
 
Rents and political settlements  
There are two critical and closely related sets of theoretical insights that we believe 
have to be incorporated in a research programme to deliver policy-relevant anti-
corruption evidence and analysis (Khan 2002, 2006a, 2006b). The aim of feasible anti-
corruption strategies is to identify combinations of institutional, organizational and 
policy changes that can actually be implemented in particular contexts, and which taken 
together, can reconfigure incentives and organizational capabilities at a specific sectoral 
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level to achieve an improvement in developmental outcomes by ruling out some 
damaging types of corruption.  
 
To do this, we first need to identify the rent-seeking processes through which different 
organizations and interests distort the achievement of particular development outcomes 
as a result of their attempts to capture rents. This is a critical part of the analysis because 
we need to understand what is going wrong at a sufficient level of detail to be able to 
assess the required content and therefore the feasibility of anti-corruption strategies 
addressing the problem. Secondly, we need to assess the relative organizational power 
of the different interests involved to assess the resistance to particular changes, and the 
feasibility of constructing appropriate coalitions to counter this resistance.  
 
The first component of research identifying feasible anti-corruption strategies is 
therefore based on an understanding of the diversity of ‘rents’ and the types of 
corruption associated with different rents. Corruption happens when there are valuable 
resources to capture and the rule-violating decisions of bureaucrats, politicians and 
often businesses determine their allocation. Rents describe the incomes that are created 
both by the formal policies of states as well as their informal or illegal distortions of 
these policies when they tax or subsidize, allocate resource like land or natural 
resources, create employment in public organisations, or introduce regulations that 
impose costs and benefits on different parties and so on. Corruption may be triggered 
if individuals try to influence these decisions in informal or illegal ways or if public 
officials directly appropriate these incomes or resources for themselves or their clients 
(Khan 2000a, 2000b, 2005a).  
 
The economic consequences of corruption depend on the factors triggering the 
corruption and the determinants of the strategies of rent-seeking organizations. 
Different underlying drivers can result in very different types of corruption with very 
different effects on developmental outcomes. An anti-corruption strategy that fails to 
analyse the underlying factors triggering the corruption can inadvertently lead to very 
damaging consequences. For instance, some corruption is the result of market 
restrictions created deliberately or inadvertently by states. Market restrictions can 
generate corruption because businesses will try to work around these restrictions. In 
this case an anti-corruption strategy can be damaging unless it is combined with a policy 
to remove the restrictions driving the corruption. Preventing this type of corruption 
while retaining the restrictions could actually make society worse off by restricting 
potentially useful businesses. On the other hand, corruption can also distort potentially 
useful policies and thereby directly damage development outcomes. For instance, 
government subsidies to the private sector to invest in cleaner or more productive 
technologies can fail if firms can bribe to flout the conditions attached to these 
subsidies. This corruption is just as important to attack, but here the underlying policies 
triggering the corruption should not be thrown out. However, we may have to think of 
new policy designs to ensure that attempts at corruption are more easily blocked and 
the desired social objectives are achieved to a greater extent.  
 
In more complex cases we can have many different types of rents coexisting in an 
activity and careful analysis is required to identify what needs to be done. Without a 
theory and analysis of rents we cannot have a policy-relevant theory of corruption. This 
is particularly important when general improvements in the enforcement of all rules are 
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not immediately likely, and we are looking for specific anti-corruption priorities 
targeting adverse outcomes in particular sectors. 
 
The second component of anti-corruption research has to engage with the micro-macro 
interface between individual decisions and collective power structures as this 
determines the feasibility of particular types of anti-corruption strategies. Here, the 
analysis of political settlements (Khan 2010) provides a framework for analysing how 
the distribution of organisational power can constrain or enable particular types of 
institutional and policy changes. This is a useful lens for looking at policy 
interdependencies and the political feasibility of introducing and implementing specific 
policy combinations in particular contexts.  
 
Governance failures of different types in developing countries often have a common 
source in the significant ‘informality’ in the operation of the economy and polity as 
well as the use of political rents to maintain ruling coalitions. These features of 
developing countries are related to the dominance and power of organizations that do 
not have an interest in the enforcement of formal rules in general, but some of them 
may occasionally want the enforcement of some rules that are aligned with their 
interest. Anti-corruption policies can only be successful in a sustained way if they are 
designed to operate in areas of intersection where the interests of at least some powerful 
organizations can be changed or mobilized through appropriate policy changes to 
achieve effective support for anti-corruption enforcement activities. For instance, 
corruption in a particular activity can sometimes be feasibly addressed if incentives for 
some powerful organizations involved in the corruption can be changed, if new 
collective action of groups harmed by that corruption can be organized and feasible 
improvements in some targeted governance capabilities can be achieved. The political 
settlements framework offers a lens for examining these types of possibilities (Khan 
2013a). 
 
Evidence gaps  
Our identification of gaps in the evidence on anti-corruption is consistent with the 
findings of a number of recent surveys of the corruption literature (Johnsøn, et al. 2012; 
DFID 2015) and we take the research agenda forward in significant ways. The analysis 
of rent configurations and overlapping types of corruption in different political 
settlements can help to explain why corruption appears to be so resilient to conventional 
anti-corruption strategies. If the underlying rent problems are different across sectors 
and countries, different policy combinations will be required in different sectors and 
countries. Moreover, if the political settlements describing the relative power and 
capabilities of organizations is also different, the same policy responses will not be 
feasible in every context, and this too can explain why different policy combinations 
will be required in different contexts.  
 
A rents and political settlements approach can also help to explain why much of the 
evidence on the causes and effects of corruption appears to be so anomalous. If quite 
different types of corruption are involved in different contexts, the ‘average’ effects of 
corruption picked up by statistical analysis will depend on the mix of different types of 
corruption in different countries. As a result, the overall effects of corruption that 
statistical exercises pick up can be very sensitive to the choice of countries, sectors and 
time periods. Corruption can therefore paradoxically appear to be compatible with 
development in some cases (like the East Asian tigers in the 1960s or China in the 
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1980s) while being seriously damaging in many other developing countries (Rock and 
Bonnett 2004; Khan 2006a, 2006b).  
 
In the same way, simplistic attempts to identify the efficacy of anti-corruption policies 
or combinations of policies that can work in every country can produce very weak 
results (Treisman 2000). This can be explained in two ways. First, countries face a 
diversity of corruption problems with different and overlapping rents in different 
sectors and this means that different policy combinations are required for different 
sectors and problems. Secondly, differences in the political settlements across 
countries, sectors and regions mean that different combinations of policies may be 
required to address the same types of corruption problem in different political contexts.  
 
Evidence on corruption and the private sector.  
The ability of the private sector to do business in corrupt environments appears to vary 
widely across sectors and countries, as do the apparent effects of private sector 
corruption. The effects of private sector corruption can include obstacles to doing 
business, the prevention of entry, the survival of inefficient firms, overpricing, 
regulatory failures, investments in the wrong sectors, cost inflation and so on. A few 
policy instruments cannot address all these problems. General improvements in 
governance, the rule of law and ‘doing business’ conditions can help, but we know that 
progress on these dimensions is slow in developing country political settlements. Part 
of our research will address general regulatory questions but the thrust will be detailed 
country- and sector-specific analysis, and cross-country comparisons to identify similar 
clusters of anti-corruption problems and to generate evidence on these anti-corruption 
evidence (ACE) clusters in terms of the strategies, difficulties and impacts of anti-
corruption activities of different types. While there are some general corruption issues 
affecting the private sector, anti-corruption analysts increasingly recognize the 
importance of country and sectoral specificities in designing effective programmes 
(Spector 2005; Campos and Pradhan 2007).  
 
The diverse types of rents and corruption in the private sector means that the private 
sector cannot be generally treated either as a victim of corruption or as a perpetrator. It 
can be one or the other or both, depending on sectors and countries. The private sector 
is often a victim of some types of corruption and is often vocal against it, and at other 
times it is primarily a beneficiary, and drives corruption through links with bureaucrats 
and politicians. As a result, private sector support for anti-corruption initiatives at the 
collective level through business associations and other means has usually been half-
hearted and largely ineffective. In many countries, almost all firms are involved in some 
types of corruption, and even firms that are victims will often not want to rock business 
arrangements they have developed to solve these problems by exposing their own 
involvement in corruption. In some cases, the political settlement is such that almost all 
operations involve some informal or entirely corrupt activity, and this constrains firms 
from taking particular complaints too far, because public officials can expose them in 
other areas. In this context, general anti-corruption strategies are unlikely to work, and 
even very specific ones have to be carefully designed to align interests with feasibility. 
Our research on private sector corruption will be driven by the recognition that the 
private sector is diverse and corruption relationships vary significantly across countries, 
sectors and types of firms.  
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The types of corruption a firm can engage in can change over time, with changes of 
government, at different stages of the firm’s life cycle and so on. Evidence and analysis 
of these differences is critical for identifying feasible and high-impact anti-corruption 
strategies in particular sectors, and for creating incentives to induce potentially 
compliant firms to actually begin to support anti-corruption measures. Our work on 
private sector corruption has demonstrated the usefulness of a process analysis 
approach for identifying different types of rents and rent-seeking processes in particular 
activities, and therefore the necessary policy combinations required for effective anti-
corruption strategies in these contexts (Khan 2014; Mathieson 2014).  
 
The growing evidence base on the problems that drive private sector corruption 
provided by the World Bank’s Doing Business initiative has been valuable. However, 
much of this work assumes that the private sector suffers from particular types of 
corruption problems that can be addressed by reducing unnecessary market restrictions 
and failures in the service delivery functions of the state. However, an understanding 
of firm and sectoral diversity suggests that the corruption driven by unnecessary market 
restrictions are not the only types of damaging corruption in the private sector. 
Moreover the corruption driven by market restrictions often do not satisfy our criteria 
of having a high impact and being feasible to address. Not enough attention has been 
given to the generation of systematic evidence on other types of rent distortion and rent 
extractions that the private sector has been implicated in, sometimes as victim but often 
as a driver. The ACE programme will generate new and complementary evidence on 
different types of corruption involving the private sector in a diversity of sectors, and 
classify the most important/feasible anti-corruption strategies in clusters that will allow 
for comparative policy and research evaluation. 
 
Evidence on policy interdependencies affecting anti-corruption.  
Existing research shows that with the exception of a small number of technical 
measures like PFM, the vast majority of anti-corruption interventions have weak and 
contested impacts (Johnsøn, et al. 2012). Attempts to discover effective policy 
combinations through cross-country comparisons have also delivered limited results. 
One reason for this is that interdependence makes it very difficult to identify policy 
effective combinations from regression exercises if effective combinations are very 
specific to countries and even sectors. Policy effectiveness depends on the presence or 
absence of supporting policies and governance capabilities but equally, just saying that 
‘context matters’ does not help. Generating useful evidence depends on effective 
strategies for making the problem of interdependence tractable for analysis. Societies 
are differently constituted, politically, institutionally and culturally: they constitute 
different types of ‘political settlements’. We believe a tractable method of looking at 
the relationship between policy choices and the collective characteristics of a society is 
to use frameworks like political settlements to generate evidence on combinations of 
policies that are effective in  countries with identifiable types of political settlements. 
This will help policy-makers identify policy feasibility in different contexts as well as 
priorities for action.  
 
But we need to spell out what we mean by identifying the interdependence between 
policy combinations and political settlements. The distinction between policy variables 
and collective institutional and social characteristics is again relevant here. It is not 
useful to discover a correlation that shows that a particular combination of policies is 
effective for anti-corruption in a sector or in a country where the political settlement is 
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very different from our target. Therefore, questions on interdependence have to be 
framed quite differently. We first have to know the combinations of policy variables 
that we are trying to introduce to solve specific sectoral problems in particular political 
contexts. This is why an interdependence analysis must draw on an understanding of 
rents and corruption typologies as well as political settlements. The policy objective is 
to develop a methodology for identifying policy combinations of potentially effective 
policies for improving development outcomes in particular sectors and activities that 
are sufficiently implementable given the macro-characteristics of a particular society.  
 
For this reason, a study of interdependence should focus on specific sectoral questions 
because interdependencies at a very broad level of aggregation often do not have clear 
policy responses. At the highest level of aggregation (the developing country as a 
whole), there are so many interdependent institutions and governance capabilities that 
are either weak or dysfunctional that policy effectiveness would require too many 
difficult problems to be simultaneously fixed. This is not feasible, and is one reason 
why ambitious ‘good governance’ reforms have not resulted in positive results in most 
developing countries. This too supports the recognition referred to earlier that anti-
corruption has to have a strong sectoral focus and work from the bottom up (Campos 
and Pradhan 2007). 
 
The impact and feasibility of anti-corruption strategies  
The measurement of the level and impact of corruption is not simple and is obviously 
constrained by the secrecy associated with corrupt practices. Standard approaches to 
the quantification of levels of corruption include surveys based on perceptions and 
subjective evaluations, or the observation of ‘proxy’ characteristics correlated with the 
corruption. Each of these approaches has its problems (Søreide 2006). For instance, 
surveys based on perceptions have the problem of subjective distortion and the 
definition of corruption is generally too broad to distinguish between types of 
corruption at an operational level. The problem of using proxies (such as delays in 
health delivery, or leakages from budgets) to infer corruption at the operational level is 
that variations in these may be due to factors other than corruption. It is often also 
difficult to define a proxy that is entirely unconnected to outcomes, so unless we are 
careful, the measure of corruption can get confused with the outcome, and then one 
cannot be strictly used to explain the other. There is therefore a need for new types of 
evidence, and to develop the usefulness and applicability of existing proxy indicators 
and other approaches.  
 
The existing approaches to evidence are also often inadequate because the magnitude 
of corruption is often not a good guide to the effects of corruption as different types of 
rents may be involved. A rents analysis shows that the impact of corruption depends 
not only on the extent of corruption (measured by the level of bribes) but also on the 
extent to which the corruption distorts the policies necessary for achieving important 
policy goals. This is why the same magnitude of corruption can have very different 
effects on development outcomes (Khan 2000a, 2000b). Relatively small bribes in some 
activities (like evading rules on building regulations) can do a lot more damage than 
bigger bribes elsewhere. This knowledge can help policy design because we know that 
aggregate levels of corruption may take time to reduce given the characteristics of the 
political settlement and the prevalence of patron-client politics. Anti-corruption policies 
that aim to reduce corruption across the board therefore often have limited effects. In 
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contrast, if we can identify the types of corruption that have a high negative impact in 
some areas, anti-corruption efforts can be targeted in line with our theory of change. 
 
An appropriate response to this challenge is to supplement the aggregated and indirect 
quantitative evidence with new types of qualitative and quantitative anti-corruption 
evidence based on pragmatic assessments of impact and feasibility using robust and 
transparent methodologies. The impact of a potential anti-corruption strategy measures 
the estimated effect of that strategy on development outcomes, and therefore the 
desirability of pursuing that anti-corruption strategy. The assessment of impact cannot 
be simply based on an assessment of the magnitude of bribes but has to estimate the 
economic impact of the corruption on outcomes. These could be economic growth, but 
could also be the effect on other socially desirable outcomes like environmental 
protection, economic diversification, the inclusion of the poor or of women, health 
outcomes, equity and so on, depending on the characteristics of the sector or activity 
being assessed.  
 
The feasibility of an anti-corruption strategy is a measure of the difficulty of 
implementing the specific strategy. Attacking a low-impact variant of corruption can 
waste policy resources even if it can be implemented, but so can a policy that addresses 
a high-impact variant of corruption that is not feasible to implement. Feasibility can be 
measured along a variety of dimensions: how many policies and governance 
capabilities need to be addressed, how difficult each of these changes are, and so on. 
The approach to assessing feasibility will depend on the type of corruption in the sector 
or activity being studied, and the objective is to rank the difficulty of implementation 
of different anti-corruption strategies and to assess whether the risk of failure is 
commensurate with the investment in policy implementation and the potential gains if 
some measure of success can be achieved.  
 
3. Feasible and high-impact anti-corruption  
Conventional anti-corruption strategies have delivered poor results in the adverse 
contexts typical in developing countries where rule violations are widespread. An 
effective anti-corruption strategy in these contexts will typically require a combination 
of two responses. First, the anti-corruption strategy is likely to have to enhance the 
capacities of some critical governance agencies related to the monitoring and 
enforcement of the rules relevant for that particular corruption problem. But secondly, 
and this is often not recognized, there also has to be a strategy to create effective 
localized support from powerful agencies and organizations that can help the 
enforcement of particular anti-corruption strategies. The second part of the anti-
corruption strategy is critical in developing countries where widespread rule-violations 
happen on an everyday basis. The feasibility of a particular anti-corruption strategy is 
therefore likely to require not only targeted capacity improvements within relevant 
governance agencies, but also policy combinations that change the incentives of some 
relevant and locally powerful players to make the governance and enforcement task 
feasible. This approach to anti-corruption is summarized in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Feasible and High-Impact Anti-Corruption Strategies 
 
The critical component of this incremental, bottom-up approach to anti-corruption is 
the identification of various types of strategies for creating localized support for the 
enforcement of anti-corruption. This in turn involves identifying the incentives and 
characteristics of critical organizations involved in specific corruption processes at the 
micro-level. By analysing the rent capture processes and the relative power of the 
different organizations involved in these processes in particular sectors or activities, it 
is possible to assess the feasibility of creating coalitions of support for anti-corruption 
in that particular sector or activity. In the next section we will discuss four broad types 
or clusters of anti-corruption strategies that can help to create coalitions supporting anti-
corruption in different types of contexts.  
 
This approach to anti-corruption is underpinned by a particular theory of change. The 
proposition is that in countries where levels of development and political settlements 
do not yet allow the effective enforcement of generalized formal rules,  
 
● IF anti-corruption can sequentially attack corruption in sectors and activities 
where anti-corruption is both feasible and has a high impact,  
 
● THEN, corruption levels will decline at an accelerating pace,  
 
● BECAUSE, these targeted strategies will enhance developmental outcomes, 
helping to create a more broad-based economy with a growing number of powerful 
organizations that will want rule enforcement in their own interest. This will make 
possible successively more ambitious anti-corruption strategies. Eventually, 
strategies targeting higher-level institutional characteristics like the enforcement of 
a rule of law or society-level transparency and accountability become more likely.  
 
Thus, both the incremental, bottom-up strategy described in Figure 2 and the 
conventional, top-down or systemic approaches to anti-corruption described in Figure 
1 are required at different stages, with the more ambitious top-down anti-corruption 
strategies gaining in policy relevance with the level of development and the spread of 
productive capabilities in the economy. However, the priority in most developing 
countries is likely to be the bottom-up targeted anti-corruption that is based on a sound 
analysis of the corruption blocking critical and specific development goals. Much of 
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the existing anti-corruption evidence and strategies do not satisfy these requirements 
and our approach to the ACE programme focuses on (but is not restricted to) filling this 
gap in evidence and policy analysis.  
 
The anti-corruption evidence (ACE) research programme is therefore driven by two 
‘guiding theories’ which respond to key evidence gaps identified in the literature. These 
provide us with the tools to identify critical research questions and projects and to locate 
a large number of different research questions in a coherent research map that can 
generate policy-relevant evidence. These are theories of political settlements, and 
theories and typologies of rents, rent seeking and corruption. However, within each 
research question we will use a wide diversity of methods and approaches to identify 
impact and feasibility of particular anti-corruption strategies. 
 
A) Political Settlements, Institutions and Governance. An important strand of recent 
research we draw on is the literature on how governance in developing countries is 
constrained by the configuration of their political settlements (Khan 1995, 2010, 2012; 
Roy 2012). It is now widely recognized that the poor enforcement of formal institutions 
in developing countries is not an anomaly that can be solved simply by investing in 
enforcement agencies or supporting transparency initiatives or the rule of law. These 
‘top down’ initiatives can sometimes help, but the configuration of organisational 
capabilities and powers means that informal processes of rent allocation and capture by 
powerful and largely informal organisations are likely to remain important for some 
time. In particular, informal power networks are likely to continue to distort the 
operation of formal institutions in these countries.  
 
The importance of this strand of literature, which engages with a number of related 
political economy approaches, is twofold. The analysis of the current political 
settlement and its direction of evolution provides an overall framework for the risk 
assessment of anti-corruption and other development programmes in a country. 
Secondly, mapping the relative power of the organisations and agencies involved in a 
particular corruption process is necessary to determine the feasibility of different anti-
corruption strategies. 
 
B) Rents, Rent Seeking and Corruption. The work of Joseph Stiglitz and other leading 
economists has shown that different types of rents (broadly defined as incremental 
income flows associated with particular policies or institutions) can have complex 
effects (Stiglitz 1989, 1996). Some rents are essential for well-working markets and to 
achieve good development outcomes (for instance efficiency wages or health sector 
subsidies), while other rents can destroy value and block development (monopoly rents, 
predatory extractions). Corruption is likely to be involved whenever policy creates rents 
in developing countries because their political settlements allow rule-violating 
behaviour to influence the creation and allocation of particular types of rents. To engage 
in anti-corruption activities in these contexts, we have to locate the corruption in the 
context of specific policies and rents to determine the package of policy responses that 
are required to improve development and welfare outcomes. In some cases anti-
corruption has to be combined with the removal of the policies that created damaging 
rents, in other cases anti-corruption has to be combined with policies to strengthen or 
redesign policies that create socially beneficial rents. Corruption is most damaging 
when it supports the persistence of damaging rents, or distorts or destroys potential 
developmental rents (Khan 2000a, 2000b, 2004).  
14 
 
 
Types of corruption, feasibility and impact  
The analysis of rents allows us to distinguish different types of corruption, based on the 
classification in Khan (2006a). This classification reveals some general characteristics 
of different types of corruption and indicates the feasibility and impact of anti-
corruption strategies targeting each of these types of corruption. While several different 
types of corruption can coexist in particular sectors and activities, it is useful to assess 
the potential impact and feasibility of anti-corruption strategies targeting particular 
types of corruption identified separately.  
 
Market restriction-driven corruption emerges when there are unnecessary or 
damaging market distortions created by states either deliberately or inadvertently, 
which are in turn evaded by businesses and individuals using corruption. Corruption of 
this type is therefore a response to restrictions like unnecessary red tape, barriers to 
entry, or regulations that are either unnecessary or that the state does not have the 
capacity to enforce but which can block productive business activities. These types of 
market distortions and restrictions create damaging rents by preventing entry into 
particular sectors or activities, and corruption in this context can paradoxically reduce 
the overall effects of damaging rents by transferring some rents to public officials to 
allow some restrictions to be by-passed. This type of ‘greasing the wheels’ can appear 
to be efficiency-enhancing in a superficial sense but the problem is that it generates 
incentives for the persistence of distortions and restrictions and can create incentives 
for the creation of new restrictions. If this type of corruption is not addressed, the overall 
efficiency of the economy is likely to decline over time. This is the type of corruption 
that is implicitly targeted in the World Bank’s Doing Business surveys. However, anti-
corruption activity here cannot simply be to attack the corruption, it has to 
simultaneously remove the market distortions, otherwise society can become worse off 
as a result of the anti-corruption.  
 
In contrast, in Policy-distorting corruption, the underlying state policies and associated 
rents are potentially socially useful and corruption prevents these policy-induced 
resource flows from achieving development goals. For instance, health, education, 
environmental or technology upgrading policies implicitly create rents for different 
types of organizations providing important services or engaging in activities that have 
a social benefit. If these rents and the policies allocating them are distorted by 
corruption and other types of rent-seeking activities, socially desired outcomes are not 
achieved. This is potentially a very important type of corruption because at the sectoral 
level in many developing countries, the failure to design necessary policies and 
regulations in ways that can be effectively implemented can seriously constrain 
development.  
 
The impact of policy-distorting corruption can vary greatly across sectors and countries. 
In some cases it can have relatively mild distortionary effects, mainly redistributing the 
benefits of policy between businesses and public officials. For instance, if the state has 
the capacity to withdraw rents from organizations that do not perform, public officials 
can corruptly claim a share of the additional profits of firms and organizations receiving 
support without significantly distorting the development outcome. This was the case, 
for instance, in the corruption in the granting of industrial policy support to South 
Korea’s chaebol in the 1960s and 1970s. The redistributive effects of that corruption 
were undesirable but it did not seriously distort policy and therefore did not constrain 
15 
 
the country’s development (Khan 2000b). In other cases, the policy-distorting 
corruption can have seriously damaging effects because the distortionary effect is more 
significant and results in the wrong organizations getting support or in rents not being 
withdrawn even when outcomes are very poor. Thus, while policy-distorting corruption 
is always damaging, the effects can vary significantly across cases. An assessment of 
the severity of the impact of policy-distorting corruption in different sectors and 
countries, and the feasibility of responses has to be an important focus of research on 
anti-corruption.  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the critical difference between these two types of corruption in 
terms of the anti-corruption policy package that is implied. The difference is significant 
because in one case anti-corruption has to remove the underlying policy that drives the 
corruption while in the other, anti-corruption has to maintain the policy structure or 
redesign it in ways that make the anti-corruption policy feasible. This reiterates why 
the analysis of the rents involved in particular sectoral or policy problems is vitally 
important. Policies and interventions that are market restricting and those that are 
potentially beneficial are not always clearly distinguishable. A transparent analysis is 
required to identify the characteristics of the rents and the effects of corruption in 
particular sectors and countries. Without that, an anti-corruption strategy can 
inadvertently do more harm than good. Moreover, the same sector may have 
overlapping policies so that some of the corruption in the sector may be driven by 
market restrictions and some may be policy-distorting. In these cases, which are quite 
typical, a careful sectoral analysis is required to identify the welfare enhancing anti-
corruption policy combinations.  
 
 
Figure 3 Corruption and the importance of a rents analysis 
 
Political corruption describes rent creation and allocation through informal patron-
client networks through which powerful groups maintain their power, particularly in 
political settlements where informal resource flows are a critical part of political 
allocations. As important elements of this type of corruption are closely related to the 
type of political settlement, it is often not easy to fight, particularly in developing 
countries, where patron-client politics and informal rent flows play an important role in 
political stabilization (Khan 2005a, 2010; North, et al. 2013). The reduction of political 
corruption is a longer term challenge, and is related to our theory of change identifying 
the importance of creating a more diversified and productive society with a wide 
diversity of organizations capable of paying significant taxes. In many cases, therefore, 
the best response in the medium to short term is to identify the most important power 
networks and design developmental programmes and policies so as to insulate them as 
much as possible from political rent capture. The failure to understand the drivers of 
political corruption has resulted in many anti-corruption initiatives failing. An analysis 
of the specific political settlement is therefore vital background analysis because the 
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feasibility of addressing other types of corruption depends on the ways in which 
political corruption is intertwined with other corruption.  
 
Finally, Predatory corruption is a particularly damaging variant where coercion and 
violence is used by powerful groups to extract rents. This type of corruption becomes 
dominant in advanced stages of state failure. Fortunately, while some elements of 
predatory corruption exist in every developing country, it is not the dominant form of 
corruption in most cases. When predatory corruption becomes the dominant form of 
corruption, anti-corruption strategies of the type we are discussing are no longer 
sufficient. State-building activities and the construction of a less violent political 
settlement become priorities for society. In principle, the anti-corruption requirement 
here is to strengthen the enforcement capacities of the state but it also has to ensure that 
the ruling coalition has sufficient legitimacy to rule without excessive repression. This 
can be hugely complex and challenging. Our understanding of the policies that can 
change political settlements in particular directions is still very rudimentary. Misguided 
policies that have sought to change the political order have often had severe unintended 
consequences in many countries. Effective policy responses to high levels of predatory 
corruption are therefore not very feasible given our existing state of knowledge.  
 
 
Source: Based on Khan (2014) 
Figure 4 Feasibility and Impact of Anti-Corruption 
 
On the basis of the discussion above, we can locate anti-corruption strategies targeting 
each of these types of corruption in terms of their relative impact and feasibility. Figure 
4 shows the likely impact and feasibility of anti-corruption strategies targeting each 
type of corruption. In reality, most sectoral activities are likely to involve several 
overlapping types of corruption. The mix is also important to keep in mind for assessing 
the feasibility of an effective sectoral anti-corruption strategy. For instance, if 
significant political or predatory corruption is involved in the operation of a sector, the 
anti-corruption policy combination may have a low feasibility even if its expected 
impact is likely to be high.  
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Market restriction-driven corruption is likely to be the most feasible type of corruption 
to address in many cases because anti-corruption may involve the removal of relatively 
small restrictions in most cases. High powered political organizations are less likely to 
be dependent on these corruption incomes and may even be persuaded that the removal 
of some of these restrictions may be in their own interest. On the other hand, the impact 
on development outcomes of removing particular restrictions and the corruption 
associated with them may not be particularly high either. In general, therefore, anti-
corruption strategies that target market restrictions are likely to be relatively more 
feasible but also have a more limited impact on development outcomes taken on their 
own.   
 
In contrast, policy-distorting corruption can have a range of outcomes, and in many 
developing countries the negative impact of this corruption can be quite high. But 
political interests are also more likely to be connected with the allocation and 
management of these rents and this can make policy-distorting corruption more difficult 
to address. Nevertheless, anti-corruption strategies targeting policy-distorting 
corruptions have the most favourable combination of impact and feasibility. Many 
variants of policy-distorting corruption are relatively feasible to attack while delivering 
a high impact if removed or reduced. This is why we highlight this variant of corruption 
in Figure 4. However, some variants of state-distorting corruption can be quite difficult 
to attack because they may be very closely tied to political corruption. For instance, 
bank lending rules may be violated to benefit inefficient politically connected 
companies. Here the corruption involved is not only policy-distorting but also has 
elements of political corruption and may therefore be more difficult to address. This is 
shown by the arrow linking some policy-distorting corruption to political corruption in 
Figure 4.  
 
Political corruption describes a range of rent creation and allocation strategies that are 
widespread in developing countries and linked to the nature of their political 
settlements. Some political rent allocations may have a relatively low impact (if they 
are largely redistributive) and some may have a very high impact (if they distort 
economic policies or result in political violence). In general political corruption is much 
more difficult to address because powerful political organizations are involved. This 
means that despite the high impact of some of these types of corruption, anti-corruption 
strategies may not fulfil the condition of feasibility in many developing country 
contexts. Finally, political corruption can at the margins change into predatory 
corruption, and this is shown by the arrow linking political to predatory corruption in 
Figure 4.  
 
Predatory corruption is in general the most damaging variant of corruption. In extreme 
cases, predatory corruption can result in the cessation of all or most normal productive 
activities and investments. Societies where warlords dominate develop variants of war 
economies where developmental outcomes are heavily constrained. Predatory 
corruption is also typically the most difficult type of corruption problem to address 
because the powerful organizations involved have substantial violence potential by 
definition, and sometimes have their own armies.  
 
Most sectors and activities are likely to have a mix of types of corruption going on, and 
the process analysis of different types of rents is essential to uncover what is going on. 
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In general, we expect the biggest gains are likely to be achieved by anti-corruption 
strategies that target policy-distorting corruptions, though in particular sectors and 
activities several types of corruption may have to be simultaneously addressed. Many 
relevant anti-corruption strategies are likely to have to address combinations of market 
restrictions and policy design and enforcement problems that drive different types of 
corruption. In general, anti-corruption strategies for a particular sector is likely to have 
to identify and target several types of corruption simultaneously.  
 
Our two guiding theories of rents and political settlements therefore define how we 
begin to look for sectors and activities where anti-corruption may be feasible and have 
a high impact. However, they do not necessarily determine the theories and 
methodologies that are most useful for digging deeper into particular research questions 
and identifying feasible and high-impact combinations of policies that are likely to be 
effective. A variety of disciplinary approaches can be used to provide deeper insights 
into the causes of and possible solutions to particular corruption problems. Some 
questions may use a deeper application of the rents and political settlements approach, 
others may use entirely different methodologies to look at, for instance, the role of 
collective action and organisations, specific features of institutions, individual and 
collective behaviour, legal frameworks and agencies, and so on. In the same way, a 
wide variety of data collection and processing strategies can be used, ranging from case 
study approaches to standard statistical techniques, RCTs and so on. 
 
4. Anti-corruption strategy clusters 
The analysis and evidence base on the likely impact and feasibility of different types of 
anti-corruption strategies are likely to be most useful if the results are comparable 
across types of problems, sectors and countries. The strategies referred to here are the 
ones described in Figure 2 as strategy clusters relevant for creating support for anti-
corruption enforcement in particular sectors and activities. There are a variety of ways 
in which localized support for anti-corruption can be created, and we find that these fall 
into a few broadly defined patterns that define a number of anti-corruption strategy 
clusters. As our aim is to generate theory and evidence on the impact and feasibility of 
different types of anti-corruption activities, we describe these policy clusters as anti-
corruption evidence (ACE) clusters.  
 
On the basis of our research so far, we identify four initial clusters of strategies that 
define the starting point for organizing the evidence generated by the ACE programme. 
Some complex corruption problems may require a combination of more than one of 
these types of strategies. Moreover, other types of anti-corruption strategies may also 
emerge in the course of the research, justifying the addition of a number of new ACE 
evidence clusters. Our four initial ACE clusters are listed below. We also provide 
examples of research questions on potential anti-corruption strategies that could be 
classified under one of these clusters.  
 
ACE Cluster 1. Incentive Restructuring Strategies 
The focus of the anti-corruption strategy here is to change the relative returns to 
different types of activities in a production or value chain to create support for 
particular anti-corruption activities within powerful insiders.  
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Many production activities involve the allocation of policy-created rents at different 
points of the chain to achieve particular development objectives. Socially harmful 
policy-distorting corruption emerges when powerful organizations in the private and/or 
public sectors capture these rents in ways that are detrimental to developmental 
outcomes. If the organizations engaged in these activities are powerful and they cannot 
be made to see the benefit of shifting to more productive strategies, attempts to enforce 
anti-corruption from above are likely to fail. In these cases, a feasible anti-corruption 
strategy has to involve policy design changes that can increase the returns to productive 
activities relative to unproductive ones. If process analysis can reveal useful points of 
entry where feasible policy changes can achieve these outcomes, anti-corruption 
enforcement can become more feasible because powerful business and state interests 
that were previously capturing rents in unproductive ways can now begin to get benefits 
by being productive. This behaviour change can support effective targeted anti-
corruption strategies in that sector, thereby improving development outcomes.  
 
In this cluster, described as incentive restructuring strategies, policy combinations are 
sought that can restructure incentives in the production and value chain in ways that 
may be attractive to powerful players in the system and achieve better development 
outcomes. If so, the self-interest of these players can be mobilized to support the 
enforcement of anti-corruption policies that now benefit them, and also help to achieve 
developmental objectives of the country.   
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ACE Cluster 1: Incentive Restructuring Strategies  
 
Illustrative example of problems in the Bangladesh Power Sector  
 
Private sector power generation in Bangladesh faces an adverse structure of 
incentives that supports damaging corruption and results in a slowdown in the 
expansion of power plants and high costs in generation. The policy 
background is that rents are used to keep the selling price of electricity to 
consumers much lower than the cost of generation. The difference is absorbed 
by the state-owned agency that buys power from private producers and sells 
to consumers. However, this method of delivering rents has adverse 
consequences for policy-distorting corruption. A large gap between buying 
and selling prices reduces the credibility of future profits for private power 
producers because a change of government can expose them to uncertainty in 
contract enforcement in contexts where contract enforcement is weak. The 
result is that the long-term profit stream is not very credible for many investors 
and they seek immediate returns through rent capture at the procurement and 
construction stage and in negotiating individual contracts that are highly 
profitable. This results in a high level of opaqueness in the process of granting 
contracts, drives out investors who are not politically connected and 
paradoxically, the high upfront profits results in intense competition between 
connected firms that slows down the allocation of contracts even in the 
absence of transparency. Powerful players who have the capacity to be 
productive do not have the incentive to behave in productive ways. However, 
policy rents can be used differently to reduce the selling price of electricity, 
for instance by setting up long-term credit at low interest rates for power and 
infrastructure projects. If the gap between the production price of electricity 
and the final sale price to consumers is reduced, the credibility of long-term 
contracts increases, and more serious investors are likely to be attracted to 
invest in power. This in turn can make some types of anti-corruption strategies 
targeting corruption in procurements feasible. It can also support measures 
requiring greater transparency in the awarding of contracts.  
 
 
ACE Cluster 2. Strategies addressing differences in organizational interests  
The focus of this anti-corruption strategy is to identify differences in interests across 
organizations who may be involved in corruption for different reasons, to create 
support for anti-corruption by a sufficient number of potentially compliant firms and 
organizations.  
 
In many sectors and activities, all or most firms or organizations involved in that sector 
may be engaged in corruption, but for very different reasons. Some firms may lack 
capabilities to comply with regulations and have to survive by engaging in corruption. 
Typically this is because they are too under-capitalized, or insufficiently productive to 
operate in the sector in a rule-following way. But other firms in the same sector could 
potentially have complied with regulations or survived without resorting to egregious 
corruption, but the absence of appropriate regulatory conditions that would allow them 
to comply mean that they too have to be corrupt. Anti-corruption is only likely to be 
effective in these contexts if policy combinations can be introduced that allow 
potentially compliant organizations to actually comply. It may also be necessary to 
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introduce exit strategies or consider other means of dealing with organizations that 
cannot comply, particularly if the enforcement of rules would result in significant 
immediate hardship or unemployment.  
 
Many sectors with entrenched corruption in developing countries are of this type. Many 
if not all firms and organizations in a sector are corrupt, but for very different reasons. 
Anti-corruption strategy has to recognize the heterogeneous nature of organizations and 
devise strategies that enable the potentially compliant to comply. One reason why anti-
corruption is so difficult in many countries is that even organizations that want to 
comply often find that they have to violate rules, and this creates a race to the bottom 
where all organizations in the sector become corrupt and non-compliant. If the 
potentially compliant group is significant, policy combinations that enable compliance 
by the latter can create powerful support that can help to make the overall anti-
corruption enforcement strategy feasible.  
 
 
ACE Cluster 2: Enhancing Compliance by Addressing Differences in 
Organizational Interests  
 
Illustrative example of Building Regulations in the Bangladeshi garments 
industry  
 
In recent work for DFID on private sector corruption we showed that the 
failure to enforce building regulations in the Bangladeshi garments industry 
was related to firm heterogeneity (Khan 2014). Potentially compliant high-
capability firms were also violating regulations because they were forced to 
bribe to get building certification. Many of them then sought to recover this 
loss by capturing rents through violations. But many other firms violated 
regulations because they had no capability to meet existing regulations and 
their profitability depended on violations from the outset. To enable regulatory 
compliance by the potentially compliant firms, it is necessary to revisit the 
long list of regulatory requirements given the limited number of inspectors and 
personnel available for issuing certification in a timely manner. This requires 
achieving a new social consensus on a more limited list of regulatory 
requirements that is essential for safety and that can actually be monitored and 
enforced with feasible improvements in regulatory capabilities. Only then can 
a large section of firms who want to comply actually become compliant. On 
the other hand, exit strategies are also required for non-compliant firms 
because they employ large numbers of poor people. Shutting them out 
overnight can result in damaging social outcomes. When organisational 
heterogeneity is the main issue, adequate policy responses involve identifying 
the different types of firms, organisations or agents so that appropriate policy 
responses can be identified, their feasibility assessed, and implementation 
phased in to address the different drivers of violations. If a sufficient number 
of capable organizations can be compliant and benefit from compliance (as is 
the case in an export-oriented sector like garments), support can be generated 
for the application of anti-corruption policy in regulatory enforcement. 
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ACE Cluster 3. Strategies of organizing collective action  
The primary focus of these anti-corruption strategies is to organize new or already 
existing groups to engage in collective action to support the enforcement of particular 
aspects of an anti-corruption strategy.  
 
While higher-level enforcement capabilities are weak and are difficult to immediately 
improve in developing countries, in some cases there are powerful local interests that 
can be mobilized to assist the enforcement of particular rules that are socially useful. A 
feasible anti-corruption strategy in some cases may be to support collective action by 
interests aligned with the enforcement of particular policies or regulations. However, 
the feasibility of this collective action and the organizations that need to be involved 
have to be carefully analysed and identified. The organisation of collective action may 
also require policy support, and again combinations of policies may be required, with 
the possibility of multiple ways of supporting the collective action.  
 
ACE Cluster 3: Organizing Collective Action 
 
Illustrative example of anti-corruption activities led by the Bangladeshi 
electronics industry  
 
Some types of corruption driven by powerful interests directly hurt other 
powerful interests and the mobilization of the latter through collective action 
can begin to help the enforcement of anti-corruption activities in that sector. 
As the power of affected groups can be increased through policy support for 
collective action, less powerful groups who are potentially powerful can be 
assisted to make a sustainable impact on the enforcement of anti-corruption. 
The emerging Bangladeshi electronics industry is hurt by the violations of 
customs duties by powerful networks of smugglers who use corruption to pay 
less or no import duties on electronics imports. This hurts the learning 
strategies of emerging electronics producers who fail to achieve productivity 
growth through learning-by-doing in production that could eventually make 
them competitive enough to survive without protection. However, to counter 
this, the electronics industry has begun to organize collective action through 
its industry association, and it pays investigators to survey shops selling cheap 
imported electronics products and report them to the National Board of 
Revenue for further investigation. This pressure occasionally produces results 
and constrains corruption. A more concerted collective action could improve 
outcomes further. Other groups of producers or consumers are less well 
organized and could be supported in similar ways. For instance, the group of 
small machinery and machine tools producers in Bangladesh could potentially 
create similar pressure for the enforcement of tax and tariff rules whose 
violation hurts their productivity enhancement strategies.  
 
 
 
ACE Cluster 4. Strategies Addressing Contested Rights 
Some corruption problems emerge because there are overlapping or contested rights 
and the only resolution available to the contesting parties is to engage in corruption to 
resolve disputes. Anti-corruption in these areas may only be feasible if policy finds ways 
of resolving the underlying conflicts. 
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The underlying problem here is that several parties may be in conflict over resources or 
rents that result from (sometimes legitimate) overlapping claims over particular policies 
or assets. This type of conflict can sometimes emerge because policies and regulations 
are (often deliberately) badly designed and confer conflicting rights and rents to 
different people or sometimes to the same person. For instance, there may be several 
interpretations of the duty payable on a particular import. Resolving these conflicts 
requires bribes, and in the simplest case, this is just a variant of distortion-driven 
corruption.  
 
The more significant and less tractable cases are where the conflicts over rights derive 
from overlapping rights that may each have some legitimacy. In this case, the 
underlying problem is not just a market restriction or distortion, but something deeper 
involving conflicting legitimate claims. For instance, different systems of rights may 
have existed over land and the conflicts between these rights may not yet have been 
fully resolved. For this type of problem, clarifications or changes in rules or 
improvements in administrative enforcement capabilities or even collective action 
responses are inadequate. Effective and legitimate conflict resolution processes have to 
be devised that can find compromise solutions that offer the parties an alternative, 
cheaper and more predictable mechanism of conflict resolution compared to 
competitively bribing land administration officials, judges and others.  
 
 
ACE Cluster 4: Strategies Addressing Contested Rights 
 
Illustrative example from Land Administration in Bangladesh  
 
The corruption in land administration in Bangladesh, as in many developing 
countries, is partly due to administrative corruption related to manipulations 
of land records. But it is also partly due to inconsistencies in the land records 
themselves that often reflect legitimate overlapping claims. The BRAC 
programme of conflict resolution in land claims affecting poor women uses 
out-of-court conflict resolution processes to find ways of resolving these 
conflicts. These types of approaches are effectively supportive of anti-
corruption strategies because they take particular vulnerable groups out of the 
remit of corruption and their exploitation by land administration officials who 
may otherwise have charged to ‘resolve’ their conflicts. Research will estimate 
the effectiveness of different types of conflict-resolution processes as a 
mechanism for avoiding corruption-driven resolutions. The interdependency 
analysis will identify the combination of governance capabilities and policies 
that enables BRAC to play this role, and to assess its effectiveness given the 
political settlement. Similar land right conflicts exist in other countries and 
conflicting claims can drive corruption in other sectors. 
 
 
5. The research agenda 
The analysis in previous sections identifies a research approach for further work on 
policy-relevant anti-corruption. The approach can be used both for examining 
corruption issues affecting the private sector as well as corruption affecting state 
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policies. In both cases, a similar methodology for identifying feasible and high-impact 
anti-corruption strategies is potentially relevant. The two following diagrams 
summarize the sequence of analytical steps in each case for designing and researching 
questions on private sector corruption and policy interdependencies, and for locating 
research questions and findings in different ACE clusters.  
 
 
 
Figure 5 Analytical Steps in Private Sector Anti-Corruption Research 
 
 
 
Select important Private Sector Corruption-Related Problem 
Process analysis to unravel overlapping rents and corruption processes 
Identification of most promising anti-corruption strategy using different methodologies
Use political settlements approaches to identify feasible anti-corruption policy combinations 
Estimate IMPACT and FEASIBILITY of the anti-corruption package
Classify evidence in one or more ACE Evidence Clusters
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Figure 6 Analytical Steps in Public Policy Interdependency Research 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Anti-corruption evidence clusters 
Select policy problem where corruption has a high impact but may be feasible to address 
Identify the interdependent policies, governance capacities and  rents responsible for damaging 
outcomes 
Identify interdependent anti-corruption strategy combinations using different methodologies 
Use political settlements analysis to identify the most feasible interdependent policies for that 
context 
Estimate IMPACT and FEASIBILITY of the anti-corruption package
Classify evidence in one or more ACE Evidence Clusters
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The aim in both our private sector and public policy research is to engage in a number 
of projects in different priority areas to generate evidence on the impact and feasibility 
of different types of anti-corruption strategies. The anti-corruption strategy that is the 
focus of each project will be located in one or more of the strategy clusters discussed 
above, and each study will also be focused on a particular priority area in one or more 
of our study countries, initially Nigeria, Tanzania and Bangladesh. The impact and 
feasibility evidence will build up an evidence base on the difficulty and desirability of 
anti-corruption strategies in each cluster, with further differentiation across priority 
areas and types of sectors and countries. Over the longer term, this evidence will help 
us to design better anti-corruption strategies not only in the particular sectors and 
countries being studied, but by building up an evidence base, it will help to deepen our 
understanding of effective policy design for anti-corruption policies in a wide range of 
economic and political contexts (Figure 7).  
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